Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.
I. Introduction
This paper studies the dynamics and determinants of inflation in the Ottoman Empire during the 1586-1913 period. There might be two main reasons for inflation; monetary expansion due to the generation of seigniorage revenue by debasing the Akçe and fiscal expansion. We used a set of political and structural variables in order to assess the dynamics of inflation and its alteration with these political variables.
We consider three main possible structures concerning the common notion of political intervention in an inflationary policy. Firstly, many wars were seen in the Ottoman period and financing a war means extra expenses. Hence, it could be interesting to examine the effects of war on the dynamics of inflation. Ferguson (1996) argues that war was inflationary in Germany during the First World War. Moreover, Bolbol (1999) finds that war was one of the main reasons for high inflation in Lebanon during the Civil War period. Similarly, our empirical results suggest that the war accelerated inflation, as was expected and fiscal expansion rather than the debasement of the Akçe was the source of inflation.
The second structure is the Partisan Political-Business Cycle (PBC), initiated by Hibbs (1977) , which deals with characteristic differences in the economic policies of governments according to their constituencies. By this line of thought, governments apply fiscal and monetary policies to favour their constituencies and economic outcomes such as the level of output and inflation: These variables fluctuate along lines as a function of the ideology of the party in power so that they will be re-elected. For example, Alesina and Sachs (1988) show that the Republican Party in the United States has been relatively more concerned than the Democratic Party about inflation rather than output since the partisan theory suggests that Democratic voters will be more concerned about unemployment relative to inflation than Republican voters. The deviation of output growth from trend occurred mostly in the first half of end term, while the rate of growth of inflation was systematically different for the entire term under the Democratic administrations. The Republican Party, on the other hand, tried to deviate inflation growth from the trend in the first half of the terms. That is, the real effects of new policies are stronger at the beginning of new administrations. Moreover, Alesina and Roubini (1992) show that elections and changes of governments in eighteen OECD economies affect inflation. They find that inflation tends to increase immediately after elections and long run partisan differences in the inflation rate are seen.
The Ottoman Empire was governed by sultans rather than political parties and there was no election system. Similarly, not all administrations had the same preferences on inflation because not everybody was affected by the inflation in the same way. The differences in the preferences of supporters caused the differences in the behaviour of each sultan. Hence, different processes were observed after the accession to the throne of new sultans. These processes represent attempts by the sultans to prevent rebellions by the soldiers and urban population. For example, the major constraint against the application of policies to overcome the unfavourable fiscal environment was the janissaries in Istanbul, special soldiers paid with the local currency (Akçe). For this reason, each sultan adopted different inflationary policies to gain the appreciation of his supporters and opponents in the first year of his reign. Therefore, we can examine how the Ottoman Empire shows the Partisan PBC or not by analysing each sultan's inflationary acts. Our results suggest that each sultan's reign showed different acceleration in inflation and the policies of the debasement of the Akçe and fiscal expansion were the main sources of inflation. Moreover, each sultan increased inflation in his first year on the throne as a result of the debasement of the Akçe or fiscal expansion.
In addition, we can take into account the different historical eras (the slow down, the recession and the break up periods) in Ottoman history in order to see the waves of inflation and the sources of inflation during those periods since each era showed different social, economic and political characteristics. Our result shows that the slow down, the recession and break up periods affected inflation positively and the debasement of the Akçe or fiscal expansion were the main reasons of inflation.
The third structure analyses the effects of the fractionalized governments (coalition or minority governments versus majority governments) on their inflationary policies. More fractionalized and more polarized governments (differences in ideological preferences) were seen in the constitutional monarchy period than in the absolute monarchy period. They faced greater difficulties in coordinating action over fiscal and monetary policies. Roubini and Sachs (1989) argue that it is more difficult for coalition governments to raise taxes and decrease government expenditures. Hence, a more fractionalized government causes higher budget deficits and inflation. Coalition is one of the main economic institutions that leads to chronic and persistent inflation (Arce and Daniel, 1994) . Minority parties and coalition governments are more constrained by electoral concerns so they try to satisfy influential constituencies and special interests in order to be re-elected (Haynes and Stone, 1990) . Hence, the debasement of Akçe and fiscal expansion caused acceleration in inflation to put in order unfavourable fiscal situations in the constitutional monarchy era. Our empirical evidence suggests that the period of constitutional monarchy had a positively significant effect on inflation. However, anti-debasement acts rather than debasement were seen, and fiscal expansion was the main reason for increasing inflation in this period. Pamuk (1997) argues that the fiscal and monetary conditions in the Ottoman Empire emerged as the primary explanation for the debasement of the Akçe during the seventeenth century. The Ottomans faced severe fiscal pressures and struggled with rising military expenditures and the adverse consequences of inflation during this period. One of the main responses to this environment was currency debasement, which provided temporary financial relief but also contributed to a new momentum of price increases. Hence, these results make his study resemble ours more. Our research differs from his study on three accounts. Firstly, he did not focus on the dynamics of inflation analyses deeply as we did; that is, he did not explain waves of inflation according to the important political structural variables. Secondly, Pamuk (1997) showed that inflation had adverse consequences on state finances. However, he only analyzed the debasement of the Akçe as a source of state finances that caused inflation, whereas, we also looked at the fiscal expansion as another main policy for inflation and examined the effects of fiscal expansion on inflation. Thirdly, he examined only the seventeenth century for the debasement analyses, while we took into account the historical eras of the Ottoman Empire (the slow down, the recession and the break up periods) and constitutional monarchy period in our analysis.
Our result shows that debasement was one of the main reasons for the acceleration of inflation in the seventeenth century. This result confirms Pamuk (1997) . However, we also proposed that fiscal expansion was another main explanation for the variability of inflation in this period. Furthermore, his article provides evidence that the debasements were the results of fiscal difficulties and that the state benefited in the short run. There was no such long-term strategy during this particular period. Similarly, when we analysed each sultan's period separately, we can see that they did not follow the same policy. However, debasement appeared in all three historical eras in Ottoman history except the period of constitutional monarchy.
This study extensively analyzes inflation dynamics with the longest historical data that is available for the Ottoman Empire. In addition, we examined the effects of different social and political situations on inflation movements. Therefore, these explanations may contribute to an understanding of why fiscal deterioration and inflation arise in the Ottoman Empire.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The data is described in the second section. The methodology is discussed and empirical evidence is reported in the third section.
The fourth section presents our conclusions.
II. The Consumer Price Index for Istanbul 1469-1918
The data for the Consumer Price Index for Istanbul is the first of its type for the Middle East, in fact for anywhere in the non-European world. It is considered as the most detailed and reliable for these four and a half centuries . It was prepared by Table 1 shows the Consumer Price Index, which combines the food prices obtained from the account books of pious foundations (vakıf) with the prices of non-food items. Table 2 presents the annual silver content of the Akçe. Pamuk constructed price indices expressed in grams of silver which were obtained by multiplying the value of the price index by the silver content of the Ottoman currency for the same year. These indices are shown in Table 3 .
The prices for Istanbul were calculated utilizing a large volume of Ottoman archival documents. They were basically extracted from data on the prices of standard commodities: food and non-food items. Three separate price indices were constructed for the food items according to the type of institution involved in consumption, whereas only one price index was constructed for the non-food items. One of the food price indices is based on the account books and prices paid by the many pious foundations, both large and small, and their soup kitchens (imaret). The second food price index is based on the account books of the Topkapi Palace kitchen. The third utilizes the officially established price ceilings (narh) for the basic items of consumption in the capital city: Istanbul.
Standard commodities were used for these price indices in order to minimize the effects of quality changes. Each of these food indices includes the prices of ten to twelve main consumption items. These are as follows: flour, rice, honey, cooking oil, mutton, chick peas, lentils, onions, eggs, sugar (for the palace only), coffee (beginning in the seventeenth century for the palace, and in the eighteenth century for the pious foundations), and olive oil for burning. Among these, flour, rice, cooking oil, mutton, olive oil and honey provided the most reliable long term series and carried the greatest in the food budget. The prices of nonfood items were obtained from a variety of sources, most importantly the palace account books. The commodities considered are soap, wood, coal and nails.
The weight of food items in the overall indices was fixed between 75% and 80%, based on the available evidence regarding the budget of an average urban consumer. The weight of each commodity in the overall index was based on the shares of each in total expenditures of the respective institutions. Greater weight was given to the indices based on the prices paid by the soup kitchens and, more generally, the pious foundations because the palace and the narh prices might be considered as official or state controlled prices. The weights of the individual commodities were kept constant as long as they were included in the index.
III. Empirical Evidence
In order to capture the effects of political and structural changes on the dynamics of inflation, the transfer function analysis is used and the following model is estimated:
where X t is the policy variable in interest; p is the lag order; Z t is the political and structural variable and ε t is the error term at time t. Here, γ is the coefficient of our interest to assess the effects of political and structural situations on inflation dynamics.
In order to conduct this study, a benchmark model is needed. An autoregressive model is estimated for the inflation process. First, inflation is calculated as the change in the logarithm of two consecutive price indices. Then, inflation was regressed on its own lags with a constant term. In order to determine the optimum lag order, the Final Error Criteria is used.
This method determines the optimum lag order such that the residual term is no longer autocorrelated. The first four lags were used to account for the dynamics of inflation, indicating the AR(4) process. Hence, inflation was regressed on its four lags with the constant term and the results are presented in Table 4 in column I of Panel A. The data set on price indices calculated by Şevket Pamuk covers the period between 1469 and 1918, but we started the sample from 1586 due to the frequency of missing observations and adopted the AR(4) process for inflation. We ended the data in 1913 to avoid the hyperinflation of the First World War years. In addition to lag values, inflation was also regressed on some political and structural variables, the coefficients of which account for the change in the dynamics of inflation not in inflation.
Getting involved in a war requires extra expenses. Therefore, we tested whether the policies adopted during the war years in order to struggle with military expenditures caused inflation or not. In order to capture the war years, a dummy variable was designed. The war variable was added to the benchmark model (It takes the value of one if there was war in this year and zero otherwise). The empirical evidence suggests that the war years accelerated inflation. However, the coefficient of the war variable is not statistically significant. 1 This result is presented in Table 4 in column II of Panel A.
The military strength of the Ottoman Empire caused heterogeneity of tax revenue in the different regions of the Ottoman Empire for the government spending requirements. Loss of some portion of land might dictate the government's fiscal and monetary setting. These two factors might determine the inflation level. Thus, three dummy variables for the three different historical eras of the Ottoman Empire are introduced: the slow down (1586-1699), the recession (1700-1792) and the break up periods. Inflation was regressed against its four lags and the three dummy variables. However, the constant term was not included in the regression. The technical reason behind this is to avoid what is referred to as the "dummy variable trap". If the intercept term, which always implicitly takes the value of one, were included with the dummy variables, which always sum up to one, perfect multicollinearity arises. Thus, the constant term was dropped out in order to avoid the multicollinearity trap. The estimates of parameters are presented in Table 4 in column III of Panel A. The empirical evidence reveals that the slow down, the recession and the break up periods affected inflation positively. However, the increasing trend of inflation was highest in the break up period, which was the worst period of the empire; and lowest in the recession period. Even if the coefficient of the break up period is statistically significant, the coefficient was not significant for the recession period. Moreover, in order to test whether each period had different inflationary policy or not, we can perform the F-test. The F-statistics value is 0.15, so we cannot reject the hypothesis that inflationary policy was the same in each period.
A change of sultans can be taken as another explanatory variable for inflation dynamics since each sultan had different economic policies in order to manage the economy. Therefore, we tested whether the different policies of each sultan caused acceleration in inflation differently. Each sultan's period dummy variables were designed for that and these were added to the benchmark model. The empirical results are presented in Table 4 in column IV of Panel A. The estimates suggest that the periods of Sultans Ahmed I, Murad IV, Osman III, Mustafa IV, Mahmud II and Mehmed Resad V showed statistically significant increasing movement in inflation. The highest acceleration in inflation was seen in the Sultan Osman III period. However, the periods of Sultans Mustafa II and Murad V showed statistically significant deflationary movements and the highest deflationary process was seen in the Sultan Mustafa II period. Moreover, in order to test whether each sultan had different inflationary act or not, we can perform the F-test. The result of the F-test is 1.96, which suggests that each sultan showed different inflationary acts at the 5% statistically significant level.
Each sultan may prefer to have more expenses during the first year in his reign since he wants to prevent rivals in order to stay on the throne longer. He may also prefer to apply favourable fiscal and monetary policies to win the good will of soldiers, supporters and opponents. Hence, we test whether the first year policies of each sultan were one of the reasons for inflation dynamics or not. In order to capture this, a dummy variable was designed and the regression result is presented in Table 4 in column V of Panel A. The empirical evidence suggests that the first year policies of sultans affected inflation positively. However,
the first year coefficient is not statistically significant.
In order to explain the effect of government policies on inflation during the period of constitutional monarchy, a dummy variable was constructed and added to the benchmark model. This is related to the effects of fractionalized governments on inflation. More fractionalized governments face higher budget deficits and greater difficulties in coordinating inflationary action in order to finance deficits. The result is showed in Table 4 in column VI of Panel A and we can say that the period of constitutional monarchy had a positive significant effect on inflation.
The regression results of the slow down, the recession and the break up periods are presented in Panel B, Panel C and Panel D, respectively, in the Table 4 . While the war years caused an increase in inflation during the slow down and the break up periods, deflationary movements were seen during the recession period. However, the coefficient of war variable is statistically significant only in the slow down period. In addition, even though the highest inflation was seen in the Sultan Osman II period and the highest deflation was observed for the Sultan Mustafa I period in the slow down era, their coefficients are not statistically significant. Moreover, the emprical results suggest that the periods of Sultans Osman III and Selim III in the recession era and those of Sultans Mustafa IV, Mahmud II and Mehmed Resad V in the break up era had statistically significant effects on the acceleration in inflation.
However, the Sultan Mustafa II period in the recession era and the Sultan Murad V period in the break up era showed a statistically significant deflation. The highest inflationary movement was seen in the Sultan Osman III period in the recession era and the Sultan Mustafa IV period in the break up era. Furthermore, the Sultan Mustafa II period in the recession era and the Sultan Murad V period in the break up era showed statistically significant and the highest deflation. These results are very parallel to the Panel A column IV results in Table 4 . Morever, although the coefficients of the first year variable are positive in both the recession and the break up periods, it is statistically significant only during the recession period. However, the coefficient of the first year variable showed a deflationary trend during the slow down period, which is not statistically significant. Moreover, the results suggest that there was statistically significant acceleration in inflation during the period of constitutional monarchy as a result of the policies, which were applied in this period.
Inflation could be observed either due to fiscal expansion or seigniorage revenue due to the debasement of the Akçe in the long run. Hence, it is interesting to examine the source of inflation. Even if Spanish gold and silver were seen during these periods, we control these with the inflation dynamics, which is captured by the number of autoregressive lag orders.
The empirical results of the debasement of the Akçe are presented in Table 5 . The Table 6 results are based on the price indices expressed in grams of silver. It is worth mentioning that even though nominal prices increased, prices expressed in grams of silver stayed in the relatively narrow range since the changes in prices in this index depend on the change in grams of silver. Therefore, the difference between two prices gives us a change in the grams of silver. The change in the grams of silver might be used as a fiscal tool given that there was no persistent supply shock and gold imports at accelerating rate. Thus, if the increase in price level is not due to a monetary factor, then it should be due to a fiscal factor. Hence, the empirical results of fiscal expansion are presented in Table 6 . The negative coefficients in Table 5 represent debasement policies and the positive coefficients in Table 6 represent fiscal expansion policies. Wars require extra expenses; in particular extra sources of increasing revenue must be relied on. According to the empirical results that are presented in Tables 5 and 6 in column II of Panel A, the war years showed anti-debasement acts, but the coefficient is not statistically significant. In addition, statistically significant fiscal expansions were seen in the war years.
Hence, we can say that fiscal expansion rather than debasement was the main reason for inflation during the war years. Furthermore, the war years caused statistically significant antidebasement movements in the recession and break up periods. However, the debasement was seen due to the effects of war years in the slow down period but its coefficient is not statistically significant. Moreover, though the war variable has positive effects on the fiscal expansion in the three historical eras, the coefficient of the war variable is not statistically significant in the recession period. These results are presented in Tables 5 and 6 in column II of Panel B, Panel C and Panel D. Therefore, we can conclude that fiscal expansion was the main reason for inflation in the war years during the three historical eras as well. In addition, debasement was the main inflationary policy to overcome the fiscal deterioration for the slow down, the recession and the break up periods. However, the coefficient of the slow down period is not statistically significant. These are presented in Table 5 in column III of Panel A.
Although the slow down and the break up period showed fiscal expansion as a source of inflation, their coefficients are not statistically significant. Moreover, a fiscal shrink was seen in the recession period but its effect was not statistically significant. These results are represented in Table 6 in column III of Panel A. The highest debasement was seen in the break up period and the highest fiscal expansion was seen in the slow down period.
Each sultan's inflationary acts can also be interpreted with the estimates reported in Tables 5 and 6 in column IV of Panel A. The F-statistics suggest that each sultan adopted different debasement and fiscal policies and accelerated inflation differently. The F-statistics are 1.92 for the equality of sultan dummies in Table 5 and 1.64 for the equality of sultan dummies in Table 6 . According to the empirical results, the periods of Sultans Mustafa I, Mehmed IV, Mahmud I, Abdulhamid I and Mahmud II showed statistically significant adaptation of debasement policies. Although most of the sultans' periods represented debasement, the highest acceleration of debasement was seen in the Sultan Süleyman II period but its coefficient is not statistically significant. However, Pamuk (2000, p.204-217) argues that the greatest debasement was seen in the Sultan Mahmud II period in the Ottoman Empire.
Hence, this result does not support our expectations. The estimates we report capture the debasement dynamic acceleration rather than the debasement itself. Hence, this could be the main reason for our differences. Furthermore, the periods of Sultans Ahmed I, Mustafa IV and Mehmed Resad V showed statistically significant fiscal expansion policies and the highest fiscal expansion was seen in the Sultan Mustafa IV period. However, the periods of Sultans Mustafa II and Murad V showed statistically significant fiscal shrink policies and the highest shrinkage can be seen in the Sultan Mustafa II period. In addition, the periods of Sultans Mustafa I, Murad IV and Mehmed IV showed statistically significant debasement in the slow down era. The periods of Sultans Mahmud I, Mustafa III, Abdulhamid I and Selim III showed statistically significant adoption of debasement policies in the recession era. The Sultan Mahmud II period had a statistically significant coefficient for the debasement in the break up era. The highest debasement was seen in the Sultan Süleyman II period in the slow down era but its coefficient is not statistically significant. The Sultan Selim III period in the recession era and the Sultan Mahmud II period in the break up era showed the highest statistically significant debasement. The highest and statistically significant fiscal expansion was seen in the Sultan Ahmed I period in the slow down era. Although the Sultan Osman III period showed the highest fiscal expansion in the recession era, its coefficient is not statistically significant. The periods of Sultans Mustafa IV and Mehmed Resad V showed statistically significant adoption of fiscal expansion policies and the highest fiscal expansion was seen in the Sultan Mustafa IV period in the break up era. These empirical results are presented in Tables 5 and 6 in column III Performing the regression analysis as an AR(4) process decreases the number of observations in the analyses due to the frequency of missing observations. Hence, we apply the AR(1) process for the inflation dynamics. In this case, we added a new dummy variable for the rise period (1478-1585). The basic results of the analyses were robust. 2 The empirical evidence suggests that war accelerated inflation as expected and fiscal expansion rather than the debasement of the Akçe was the main reason for inflation. Moreover, the slow down, the recession and the break up periods affected inflation positively; both fiscal expansion and the debasement of the Akçe were seen as sources of inflation during these three periods. However, the rise period is associated with lower inflation. Thus, during the early years of the empire (that is the rise period), there was no need to rely on inflationary policies. Hence, the empire had some ways of increasing its revenue other than the monetary or fiscal ones during the early years. However, it is important to note that even though the rise period does not show any debasement acts, we can see that the deflationary trend in inflation came from the fiscal shrinkage in the rise period, probably due to the more spoils rather than lower government spending. In addition, each sultan showed different inflationary policies in his period. However, each sultan accelerated inflation in the first year of his reign by the debasement of the Akçe or fiscal expansion. Lastly, the constitutional monarchy period had a positively significant effect on inflation; however, fiscal expansion rather than the debasement of the Akçe was the source of inflation in this period.
IV. Conclusion
In this study, we examined the dynamics of inflation in the Ottoman Empire during the 1586-1913 period. We focused on two main inflationary acts, fiscal expansion and seigniorage revenue due to the debasement of the Akçe in order to explain the behaviour of inflation. We used a set of political and structural variables, the coefficients of which account for the change in the dynamics of inflation. We also extended our sample starting point to 1478 to apply the AR(1) process to examine dynamics of inflation. Accordingly, the empirical evidence suggests that the war years accelerated inflation as we expected and fiscal expansion rather than debasement was the main inflationary policy to cope with war expenses.
Moreover, the slow down, the recession and the break up periods affected inflation positively.
Both fiscal expansion and debasement were seen in these three periods as sources of inflation.
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